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This thesis investigates measures of effectiveness
(MOE) and defines the data elements for an automated
USMC repair parts initial provisioning evaluation
system. Twenty-three specific MOEs , applicable to any
new weapon system, are proposed from five general
criteria categories: weapon system readiness, supply
support, cost, essentiality and range/depth. Then,
each MOE is examined for practical implementation
potential by identifying and/or modifying data elements
resident in USMC automated files. To assist in the
database programming of MOEs, Appendices B through E
define and cross-reference the MOEs, automated files
and data elements.
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I . THE NEED FOR PROVISIONING CRITERIA
A. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980 's the United States Marine Corps
witnessed the most profuse equipment modernization program
in its history. The Commandant of the Marine Corps
reported to Congress in January 1986, "We plan to replace
every single weapon system within the Marine Division--
from the pistol to the main battle tank--in a decade."
[1:27]. Much management and journalistic attention has
been focused upon the acquisition cost, while less has
been paid to the cost of repair parts to support these
new weapon systems. Yet support is also quite expensive.
Over the next six years the Marine Corps projects an
average of $32 million will be spent for repair parts
to support the fielding of new weapon systems [2].
Provisioning, in simple terms, is the selection and
procurement of repair parts to support newly fielded
equipment. This is no easy chore, however, because the
provisioner confronts a fundamental dilemma; namely,
predict and buy all parts that a weapon system will
need in its first years, but buy no more than needed.
If he buys too few, readiness suffers and Marines lose
confidence in the weapon and its support system. If he
buys too many, investment dollars are wasted, high holding
costs result, and other opportunities for getting a
military return on dollars spent must be foregone.
Many factors confound the provisioning effort.
Engineering configurations may change, maintenance con-
cepts may be ill-defined, equipment /part reliability
estimates may err drastically, budgets may change, vendors
vary in capabilities to support secondary requirements,
unit deployment schedules may change and so on. All
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The main objective of this thesis is to uncover and
develop useful criteria to measure USMC provisioning
effectiveness after-the-fact and, on a practical bent,
derive data element definitions to assist in the Marine
Corps Logistic Base, Albany, GA . (MCLBA) Weapons Systems
Automated Information System (WS/AIS) development effort.
An abundance of provisioning literature published
in recent years has focused either upon forecasting
models or has decried the poor results of forecasting
models in a lessons learned format. This paper will
take a different approach and describe, define and measure
the effectiveness of provisioning. This distinction is
important. While DOD and USMC directives set forth the
grand goals of provisioning, specific measures of effect-
iveness (MOEs) are not stated.
Therefore two central research questions will be
addressed
:
1. What are some useful MOEs that the Marine
Corps can apply to its provisioning process?
2. What data elements are relevant to these MOEs?
It is hoped this thesis will prompt open discussion of
MOEs by the many stakeholders in the provisioning process:
provi sioners , weapon systems managers, inventory managers,
contractors, acquisition project officers, budgeteers,
field maintenance personnel, supply personnel and, perhaps
most importantly, the Marines who will use this equipment
on the battlefield.
C. SCOPE
This paper considers only the initial provisioning
of repair parts for newly fielded USMC Fleet Marine
Force ( FMF ) ground equipment. Aviation items and
pre-positioned war reserve stocks (PWR) 1 are excluded.
Technical publication, tool, test equipment and training
provisioning is also excluded. Only repair parts issues
are addressed.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis assumes a beneficial role for explicit
MOEs
.
As Casey Stengel, former manager of baseball's
New York Yankees, once stated, "If you don't know where
you're going you may end up somewhere else." MOEs can
tell you where you are going.
As a result of recent USMC provisioning efforts,
new policy has evolved which has led to the publication
of a revised provisioning manual [3]. The intention of
this thesis is to provide a needed connection between
the broad goals and policies of provisioning and specific
measures to evaluate provisioning effectiveness.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Information was acquired by an exhaustive review of
periodicals held by the Naval Postgraduate School; review
of DOD , USMC and other service documents, reports, staff
studies and research papers from the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange; review of pertinent DOD,
DON and USMC directives and staff reports; and dozens
of interviews with MCLBA logistics managers.
For an in-depth review of provisioning issues refer
to two studies. Provisioning Responsibilities, Procedures
and Requirements Determination in the United States
Marine Corps , a 1979 thesis by Captain Paul M. Lee, USMC,
topically outlines the intricate world of Marine Corps
provisioning [4]. Marine Corps Provisioning Policy
1 PWR is USMC equipment held in storage pending
outbreak of war.
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Review Staff Study Report Of 1980 explains past problems
encountered with MOEs and data extraction [5].
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis contains five chapters and five appen-
dices. Chapter I has discussed the purpose, scope and
assumptions. Also presented were the methods of research
and the organization.
In Chapter II DOD and USMC provisioning objectives
and responsibilities are cited. Discussion of provis-
ioning processes and tasks acquaint the reader with the
basic work flow. Past USMC efforts at provisioning
measurement are synopsized and the current automated
systems development at MCLBA is presented.
Proposed measures of effectiveness are analyzed in
Chapter III. Five general categories are scrutinized
for MOE alternatives. Particular emphasis is placed
upon conceptual pitfalls likely to be encountered in
using each MOE.
Chapter IV defines specific data elements, relation-
ships and the computational aspects for each MOE of
Chapter III. One objective is to demonstrate the feas-
ibility of tracking desired MOEs with an automated infor-
mation system.
Chapter V concludes with a summary of the issues
raised and recommendations for further research.
Appendix A is a list of acronyms. Appendix B defines
each data element while Appendix C describes the sub-
files needed to isolate the data elements of interest.
Appendix D shows a cross-reference of MOEs, sub-files
and data elements. In Appendix E an MOE/Data Element
matrix is offered.
11
II . SURVEY OF USMC PROVISIONING
A. DOD POLICY
Department of Defense Directive 4140.40 establishes
the objectives and policies of initial provisioning in
support of new weapon systems. The main objective of
provisioning is to:
assure the timely availability of minimum initial
stocks of support items at using organizations and
at maintenance and supply activities to sustain
programmed operation of end items until normal replen-
ishment can be effected, and to provide this support
at the least initial investment cost. [6:2]
This instruction further charges DOD components (i.e.,
the USMC) with the responsibility for final determination
of the range and quantity of support items required for
the initial outfitting of new end items entering the
operating inventory.
Department of Defense Instruction 4140.42 sets forth
specific procedures and mathematical models to determine
the initial requirements for secondary item repair parts.
The goal is to provide the minimum number of parts needed
to achieve a satisfactory level of weapon system perfor-
mance until the more reliable actual demand history
becomes available and normal replenishment procedures
can be accomplished. [7:2] At the wholesale level, the
COSDIF model computes the range of parts to be stocked
as demand-based by comparing the expected cost of holding
the item to the expected cost of not stocking the item
over the first two years of supply support of a weapon
system [7:Encl.3]. The depth of demand-based items
includes expected demand during procurement lead time
plus a procurement cycle/safety level quantity [7:Encl.2]
Two instances occur in which nondemand-based items,
those that fail the COSDIF test, may be stocked at the
12
wholesale level: Insurance Items and numeric stockage
objective (NSO) Items. An Insurance item is an essential
item for which no failure is predicted through normal
usage, but the lack thereof would significantly degrade
weapon system readiness. An NSO item is an essential
item for which failure may be predicted, but does not
meet the demand based stockage criteria. Lack of an
NSO item would also seriously impair weapon system read-
iness. A quantity of one minimum replacement unit of
each insurance or NSO item may be stocked. Retail stocks
are determined by USMC models and will be discussed
briefly in section D of this chapter.
B. USMC POLICY
The Marine Corps Provisioning Manual of 31 January
1986 promulgates the basic instructions, procedures and
guidance of all functions and operations relating to
provisioning in the USMC. It states:
Initial provisioning must include the identification,
selection, and acquisition of items required for
maintenance, and provide instructions to ensure
that necessary initial support items are positioned
in the supply system and maintenance echelons before
new equipment is placed in service. [3:1-3]
This statement is useful for our purposes insofar as it
emphasizes provisioning ' s contribution to the maintenance
effort and stresses the importance of supply procedures.
Since these actions must occur before equipment is placed
in service, the decision-making horizon is very uncertain
C. USMC RESPONSIBILITIES
1 . Headquarters Marine Corps
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) is
responsible for the acquisition, funding, and procurement
of new weapon systems. The CMC sets provisioning policy
and monitors its execution. To do this, the HQMC staff
coordinates cross-service procurement agreements,
13
disseminates provisioning budget documentation, and
includes requirements for ordering repair parts and
provisioning technical documentation ( PTD ) . Essentially,





Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany
MCLBA is the nucleus of USMC provisioning and
has a plethora of management and technical responsi-
bilities. Rather than list all, only those pertinent
to this work are cited:
* Develop initial provisioning budget documentation;
* Develop plans to ensure orderly transition from
contractor to USMC supply support;
H Devise procedures and schedules to transmit supply
support requests to Defense Logistics Agency, General
Services Administration, or other services Weapons
Systems Integrated Materiel Managers; and
* Review interservice support agreements annually to
ensure they meet USMC provisioning requirements.
A final responsibility, central to this thesis, is best
presented directly from the source:
Establish a provisioning effectiveness evaluation
system that ensures the IIP support sustains equipment
readiness at minimum cost and minimum contribution
to excesses at the end of the demand development
period. This system should use the weapon system
code and identification number to identify usage
against a specific application. [3:1-12]
Thus, MCLBA not only manages the provisioning program
but is also charged with the creation of the program
evaluation system. Therefore, the MCLBA has considerable




As users of new weapons systems Fleet Marine
Force ( FMF ) units are the customers that the provisioning
program must satisfy. If the repair parts that eventually
are demanded are not initially available then FMF units
must take requisitioning action, and suffer degraded
readiness status while awaiting the parts. Therefore,
the full impact of HOMC and MCLBA policy, budgeting, and




There are many intricacies of Marine Corps pro-
visioning but the essence is as follows: HQMC sets policy
and budget parameters and FMF units must operate within
the constraints of initially provisioned repair parts.
MCLBA enjoys the central role of doing the provisioning;
that is, deciding what parts will be initially procured
and evaluating the effectiveness of those decisions.
Simply stated, the goal is to maintain high equipment
readiness at the least cost.
D. PROVISIONING PROCESSES
Provisioning planning commences at MCLBA upon receipt
of the Five Year Defense Plan which shows the expected
phase-in and phase-out of weapon systems. CMC issues
funding requirements which serve as a top-line dollar
figure or an upper bound for planning purposes.
The Procurement, Marine Corps Planning Execution
Shopping List sets forth the initial provisioning fin-
ancial plan. Funds are listed by weapon system and are
based on historical data of similar systems, technical
experience and parametric cost estimates. As more specif-
ic information becomes available HQMC publishes a Letter
of Adoption and Procurement which states end item replace
ment factors, life expectancy, phase in/out schedules
and maintenance factors. HQMC communicates other key
information to MCLBA in the Field Budget Guidance and
Provisioning Guidance Data. These documents detail the
breakdown of weapon systems by unit, echelon of main-
tenance responsibilities and a fielding timetable.
Selected program data from the above documents is then
entered in subsystem-10 (SS-10) of the Marine Corps
Unified Materiel Management System (MUMMS) [8].
HQMC and MCLBA jointly determine the provisioning
technical documentation required of the contractor when
15
the Marine Corps procures a weapon system. If another
service or agency procures the weapon system for the
Marine Corps, then HQMC submits a list of the PTD desired.
Provisioning technical documentation consists of replace-
ment factors, unit prices, repair times, recycle times
and other assorted data derived through logistics support
analysis [9]. MIL-STD-1388-2A provides a complete list
of data elements [10].
The Marine Corps takes an active role regardless of
the service which procures the weapon system. PTD is
combined in MUMMS SS-10 with aforementioned operational
and budget program data and is passed through assorted
mathematical models. The resulting computer output
reports furnish the provisioner with an initial recom-
mendation of how many parts to buy.
The provisioner has the final responsibility for
identification, computation and selection of initial
repair parts. Parts essential to the operational readi-
ness of combat essential equipment are closely scruti-
nized. The contractor may assign source, maintenance
and recoverabil i ty codes 2 , combat essentiality codes,
replacement factors and repair rates during preparation
of the PTD. Even so, provisioners use the Marine Corps
Level of Repair Analysis program [11], knowledge of
USMC support structures and technical judgment to review,
evaluate and adjust PTD. Technical records are then
researched to identify the appropriate WIMM for each
part because consumables that are already in the DOD
supply system are not allowed to be stocked by the Marine
Corps. In this case, the USMC will send supply support
requests to the appropriate supply source to make sure
2 SMR codes communicate the manner of acquiring
items; the maintenance levels authorized to remove,
replace, repair, assemble, manufacture and dispose of
items; and the reclamation or disposition action required
16
enough parts are in the supply system prior to the planned
material support date.
The calculation of the range and depth of repair
parts must incorporate risk factors. The Marine Corps
uses mathematical models derived from DODI 4140.42 to
initially determine specific wholesale quantities needed
to support a weapon system for a two year demand develop-
ment period [7]. Models for retail quantities are con-
tained in reference [3]. For an in-depth discussion of
these models and proposals for new models the reader
should see the 1987 study by Love and Stebbins [12].
Initial provisioning inventories can be classified
into three general categories: pre-posi t ioned war reserve,
initial system stock and initial allowance quantity.
PW~R contains materiel for both the active and inactive
mobilization forces. Since this is used only in war time,
it is not considered here. System stock are consumables
held at the wholesale level and consist of a safety
level quantity and a procurement cycle lead time quantity.
The initial system stock provides backup support for
the entire density of weapon systems until routine replen-
ishment can be established (normally two years). Stock
levels vary depending upon the criticality of the end
item, the PCLT, the replacement rate and the demand
forecasting method used. Initial screening through
MUMMS SS-10 determines whether parts can be stocked as
demand-based at the wholesale level
.
The initial allowance quantity, also called the
garrison operating level (GOL), are the initially procured
repair parts positioned at the FMF level. GOL is usually
held by a Force Service Support Group Supply Battalion.
FMF personnel normally refer to this stock as IIP, a
short-hand term for an initial issue support package
managed and monitored by the supply battalion's SASSY
Management Unit. GOL consumable depth is based on
17
estimated replacement factors and an order and ship time
(OST). Neither safety stock nor items already in the
supply system are authorized. GOL reparable depth is
based on expected operational requirements, maintenance
capabilities, OSTs , replacement rates, repair rates,
repair cycle times and washout rates. Computations for
the GOL and the IIP time horizon is described in Chapter
IV of reference [3]. The GOL, which constitutes the
IIP for FMF units, is of primary interest in this paper.
Even though mathematical models help determine the
range and depth of system stock and IIPs, provisioning
remains more art than science. The process is sensitive
to the estimates and predictions made using program
data and PTD as inputs. Therefore, the intervention of
technical value judgments by provisioners is needed.
In fact, a recent study documented that 69% of initial
parts requirements were derived from the provisioner '
s
technical judgment, not from pure reliance on the output
of mathematical models [13].
Given these complexities and uncertainties, by what
criteria should initial provisioning be evaluated?
Past Marine Corps efforts to answer this question will
be discussed next.
E. USMC EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES
During 1980, eight military and civilian experts
conducted a major provisioning program review. Taking
nearly a year to compile, the final report showed evidence
of excess provisioning of repair parts. One conclusion
stated that a high degree of equipment readiness (94%)
could be maintained despite a substantial reduction
(35%) in initial inventory. [5:5]
The "Brown Report", named after its senior member,
arrived at these conclusions after developing 13 measures
of effectiveness and searching various automated
18
maintenance and supply files for data to compare against
stated criteria. Initial MOEs included operational
readiness, shortage and overage costs, criticality meas-
ures and range and depth measures. Upon discovery that
the required data either did not exist or could not be
extracted the original 13 MOEs were reduced to 9 MOEs.
Two significant data problems were encountered.
First, there was a problem with data integrity,
much of the maintenance and supply data was considered
inaccurate or incomplete. Second, even though many of
the data elements existed, the files and programs were
not designed to extract the data in the format needed
for the analysis. Hence, costly computer programmer
hours were devoted to reconfiguring and recomputing the
data. Annex I of the Brown Report documents these prob-
lems in more detail [5]. The databases were designed
to support FMF operational needs, rather than provisioning
evaluation studies. One salient recommendation of the
Brown report was to develop a provisioning effectiveness
evaluation system [5:5].
During the 1980s, most MCLBA computer programming
efforts were devoted to the design, development and
implementation of the Marine Corps Standard Supply System.
M3S added a database management system to maintenance
and supply automated information systems files. Though
not programmed to automatically output provisioning
effectiveness measures, M3S does make data easier to
view and extract.
An April 1985 USMC provisioning conference again
resurrected the issue of an evaluation system [14].
HQMC tasked MCLBA to report the effectiveness of only a
few new weapon systems. To include all new weapon systems
would have been too costly, time consuming and cumbersome.
At the time of this writing, provisioning effective-
ness evaluation studies include only a few weapon systems
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and are done within the constraints of a database system
ill-designed for the task. No software program exists
to automatically compute MOEs and problems persist re-
garding the configuration of the database to support
this endeavor [15]. So provisioning may be evaluated
as Lee noted in 1979:
...(by) the frequency of complaints from operational,
maintenance and supply personnel ... This negative
feedback approach places enormous pressure on the
provisioner to ensure that more than enough parts
are on hand to short circuit the complaints. Without
ler
:kage
of initial support items. [4:85]
There remains a clear need for some way to feedback to
the provisioner and other logistic managers the effec-
tiveness of initial provisioning support.
F. WEAPON SYSTEM AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEM
MCLBA now plans to incorporate a provisioning effec-
tiveness evaluation system within its current weapon
system automated information system development program.
The WS/AIS is the USMC response to the 1986 DOD Secondary
Item Weapon System Management Concept and Implementation
Guide [16]. SIWSM directs the services to implement
management
,
procedural and automated systems to measure
performance by weapon system support goals not secondary
item goals.
The SIWSM concept consists of 13 management capabil-
ities, 3 of which pertain to initial provisioning:
* Multi-Echelon Opt im ization Models. Models must
compute repair" part requirements-based on weapon
system availability goals, not secondary item goals;
* Demand/Usage Reporting by Weapon System. Demand and
cl7s*t
-hi -s*t6Py Vill-be-broken 6Ut- in computer reports
by weapon system sequence; and
* P erformance Tr acking. Provisioning performance will
b£ e"TTa"lu"3te"d—by Weapon system readiness goals, not
supply goals. This approach ultimately should lead
to better computational techniques. [16:7]
An MCLBA project management team has taken a systems
engineering approach to define the conceptual baseline,
20
major tasks and overall requirements of the system. An
Initial outlook suggested M3S as a viable alternative
to SIWSM concept [17]. Upon closer Inspection, however,
it was decided that the USMC implementation of SIWSM
should be analyzed and evaluated from the standpoint of
job functions and task requirements, not from current
systems [18]. Regardless of how the development effort
proceeds there remains a bona fide need to determine
provisioning MOEs and derive the data elements needed
for implementation.
21
Ill . PROVISIONING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The mark of a good MOE is whether or not it assesses
the objective. Ideally an objective should be well-
defined, complete and appropriate to the task at hand.
Unfortunately, the objectives of provisioning are vague,
multifaceted and often conflicting; therefore the goal
of this chapter is to attempt to describe reasonable
provisioning objectives and measures. However, no pre-
scription of a hierarchy of objectives will be attempted.
It must be emphasized that problems can arise when
no cost-effective method exists to capture the data or
aggregate the information to implement an MOE. As a
result, a measurable proxy must often substitute for an
elusive MOE.
All MOEs will be designed to allow computation by
individual weapon system. This is in keeping with the
SIWSM goals noted in the last chapter. The time period
encompassed by the MOEs will be the entire time period
that the IIP was intended to support the weapon system.
Provisioning objectives and MOEs are divided into five
categories, each of which will be discussed in more
detail
:




* Range and Depth
B. WEAPON SYSTEM READINESS
The effectiveness of provisioning should ideally be
stated in terms of the readiness of the supported weapon
22
system. DOD ' s 1986 SWISM concept and implementation guide
is a driving document in this regard [16]. The ultimate
goal is to maximize equipment readiness by devising a
secondary item management scheme which provides computer
output reports in weapon system sequence.
Readiness is a bottom line figure used throughout
DOD. However, present day supply automated information
systems do not link supply performance with weapon system
readiness. The SIWSM guide directs the services to
develop these links, and thereby relate resources to
readiness. Research has uncovered three candidate MOEs




Operational availability (Ao) is the probability
that a system or equipment, when used understated con-
ditions in an actual operational environment, will operate
satisfactorily when called upon [19:64]. This measure
is a composite of inherent availability (Ai) and the




The mean time between failure (MTBF) shows the average
equipment operating time between failure. The mean
time to repair (MTTR) is the average time it takes to
repair / restore a weapon system to an operational condi-
tion. The mean logistics delay time (MLDT) shows the
average time it takes to supply resource support to a
deadlined weapon system [21:4]. Repair parts are an
important support resource, hence the relationship between
initial provisioning and readiness is encompassed in
this model
.
MLDT is not a precise measure of provisioning
because it includes delays which result from the wait
23
for tools, test equipment, transportation and facility-
space. Nonetheless, the Ao percentage does yield a
general bottom line number to help evaluate weapon system
readiness. To further isolate the effects of provision-
ing, a non-availability measure ( Np ) could be easily
computed by subtracting the inherent availability (Ai)






The current Marine Corps FMF measure of equipment
readiness is the LM2 percentage. This snapshot shows
equipment operational readiness down to the battalion
level. To compute this percentage divide the number of
weapon systems operationally ready by the total number
of weapon systems. A variety of equipment types such
as communications, engineers, motor transport and ord-
nance are combined into a single percentage score. It
therefore provides no specific feedback to provisioning
effectiveness for a given weapon system.
Fortunately, Marine major commands (Divisions,
Wings, FSSGs ) also receive a weekly computer output report
derived from LM2 files called the Equipment Status Report
which provides readiness data aggregated by weapon system.
For example, at a glance one could see the aggregated
readiness of M60 machine guns. This aggregation, if
averaged over several weeks after the material support





This measure relates weapon system availability
to its individual components based on the theory that a
system's Ao is the product of the availabilities of its
components Ao(Si) [22:34].
24
Ao(Si ) = MTBFi
MTBFI-T-MTTRi-T-MSRTi(Sl
)
The "i" subscript denotes that the measure applies only
to a specific component. MSRTi(Si) is the mean supply
response time of each component; MSRT , an approximation
of MLDT , considers only the supply system response time
part of the logistics delay. The provisioning objective
is to maximize Ao(Si) by minimizing MSRT, a variable
strongly influenced by provisioning decisions. Even
so, the minimization of MSRT does not necessarily yield
the same solution as maximizing system availability in
forecasting models [22:56]. Unfortunately, system avail-
ability is a complicated function which depends on com-
ponent availability system configuration and system
deployment. Thus, the utility of this measure for iso-
lating the effects of provisioning is doubtful.
The four availability measures of operational
availability (Ao), non-availability due to provisioning
( Np ) , LM2 readiness and component availability are can-
didate provisioning MOEs . They are bottom line measures
that loosely relate provisioning to readiness.
C. SUPPLY SUPPORT MEASURES
Supply support MOEs show how well the initial parts
inventory met the demand for parts. However, not all
MOEs directly account for the impact of provisioning upon
weapon system readiness.
1 . Mean Supply Response Time
Briefly discussed in the last section, MSRT is
a surrogate measure of MLDT that isolates the effects
of initial provisioning decisions, but excludes the
other delays normally associated with MLDT. MSRT captures
the average time it takes to satisfy a customer's requisi-
tion regardless of the source of supply. It empirically
measures IIP effectiveness: if MSRT is low, parts were
25
generally satisfied by the IIP; if MSRT is high, then
several requisitions were backordered
.
MSRT is not a perfect measure as it ignores the
cost and essentiality of parts demanded or supplied.
As an aggregate, however, MSRT relates provisioning to






SMA is the percentage of requisitions satisfied
on the first pass against system assets [23:1-19]. For
provisioning purposes it can be defined as the percentage
of requisitions satisfied on the first pass against the
IIP. SMA can be expressed in either a range or depth
measure
.
Range SMA, computed by dividing the number of
requisitions satisfied from the IIP by the total number
of requisitions received, shows how well the IIP satisfied
customer's documents. Since more than one item may be
ordered on a document number there is a chance for a
partial fill. To measure this, the depth SMA, which
divides the number of parts satisfied from the IIP by
the total demand for parts, is more appropriate.
While SMA measures the gross range and depth of
the IIP, it does not include cost or essentiality meas-
ures. Nor does SMA include time delays resulting from




This can be computed in two ways. Either divide
the number of backordered documents by the number of
documents submitted or subtract the depth SMA from one.
The backorder percentage shows a general measure of IIP
failure and suffers the same drawbacks as the SMA measure.
4
.
Average Days Delay for Delayed Requisitions
ADDDR approximates the average number of days
it takes for backorders to be filled [23:1-20]. It
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indirectly measures how well the IIP provides supply-
support. To compute ADDDR divide MSRT by one minus the
range SMA
.
ADDDR, like other supply performance measures,
does not address cost or essentiality.
5 . Summary
This section discussed provisioning MOEs in
terms of supply performance. Mean Supply Response Time
shows the average number of days needed to get parts,
regardless of inclusion in the IIP. The Supply Material
Availability shows a gross percentage of how well the
IIP matched up to actual demand. Its converse, percentage
of backorders, gives a gross measure of the IIPs inade-
quacy in the face of actual demand. Average Days Delay
for Delayed Requisitions reflects the severity of the
response time when the part was not in the IIP.
D. COST MEASURES
Another way to view provisioning effectiveness is
through the eyes of Congress; namely, through cost related
measures. These measures try to compare the investment,
holding and obsolescence costs of parts to the conse-
quences of not having the parts in the IIP.
Determining the costs due the lack of parts in IIP
is impossible. Though we know that for the want of a
carburetor a jeep is lost, it is impossible to quantify
the cost of not having that jeep on the battlefield.
The cost would have to account for its mission, the
intensity of need, the availability of other jeeps, and
so on. Therefore, our focus is on more commensurable
measures which deal with the costs of excess parts or
backorder ing
.
1 . Investment Costs
The investment cost of the IIP is simply the
dollar value of all parts. Ideally, over the IIP support
time period, all demand is met by the IIP and all IIP
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stock is consumed. Rarely does the IIP correlate exactly
with actual demand, thus, shortage and overage costs are
incurred. The total IIP investment cost does provide a




When demanded parts are not available in the
IIP a shortage cost is incurred. The shortage cost
consists of two parts, the cost of an inoperable system
and the special order processing costs to backorder the
part from the wholesale system. As stated earlier the
dollar value of an inoperable weapon system will not be
computed; insight into the severity of weapon system
inoperabi 1 i ty can be gained from the Np MOE discussed in
section B above. The processing cost per order can be
derived empirically or the USMC could use values similar
to those used by Lhe Navy or cited in DODI 4140.42
[7:Encl.3]. Order costs include the administrative and
processing costs incurred to order parts. The total order
cost can be used to show an aggregate dollar value
incurred over the specific IIP time period.
This measure is similar to the backorder per-
centage measure mentioned earlier. Though It might
seem that we would want to minimize it, that is not so.





An overage cost is incurred when there is no a
demand for an IIP part. The total overage cost includes
the cost of holding stock, the obsolescence costs, and
the time value cost of the money that was invested in
the stock. Holding costs include the warehousing, per-
sonnel and materials handling incurred to keep inventory.
Like the processing cost per order, the inventory holding
rate should be derived empirically and set as a matter
of policy. The Navy assumes it to be 21& for consumables
28
and 23$ for reparables of the unit cost per year that
the item is in inventory. DODI 4140.42 assumes a 20$
inventory holding rate [7:Encl.3]. Overage costs can





It might also prove useful to divide the dollar
value of IIP excesses by the IIP investment cost. Such
a percentage would give some perspective of the costs
of excesses to the investment made in the inventory.
5 Summary
The three general costs discussed in this section
were the Investment cost, the order cost and the overage
cost. From this discussion four candidate measures
emerged. The first was the IIP investment cost which
is the dollar value of the IIP. The order cost included
the administrative and processing costs to expedite a
backorder to the wholesale level. The overage cost
included inventory holding costs, obsolescence costs
and the opportunity cost of money. Finally the overage
cost percentage shows the cost of investing in parts
that were not demanded relative to the IIP investment
cost
.
One drawback of the cost perspective is that it
may cause too much attention on the costs of provisioning
without equal attention to the benefits derived. The
next set of MOEs will deal with the actual utility of
IIP parts.
E. ESSENTIALITY MEASURES
The measures discussed thus far do not address the
difficult issue of whether the parts are critical 3 to the
functioning of the weapon system. The weapon system
3 For our purposes the terms essential and critical
are synonymous.
29
readiness, supply performance, and cost MOEs focused on
aggregates and percentages without regard for criticality
of the parts.
The measurement of repair part criticality is compli-
cated. A 1982 General Accounting Office report stated
that a DOD-wide criticality coding scheme does not exist,
but that one should [24:1]. The Kiebler and Colaianni
criticality coding scheme, sponsored by DOD, has not
been adopted [25]. DOD has directed each military service
to develop its own criticality coding scheme, however
no explicit directive requires integration of these
schemes. Thus, even if a coding scheme could be devel-
oped, the problem of inter-service incompatibility would
continue to exist; this incompatibility would severely
impact upon the Marine Corps because many of its weapon
systems are procured by other services.
Incorporation of criticality indices has been demon-
strated in the Richards and McMasters wholesale provi-
sioning models of MSRT and SMA [22]. Therefore the afore-
mentioned supply support and cost MOEs could incorporate
essentiality. Unfortunately, a linear model is required
for the essentiality term in the reference [22] models.
No such model has been developed as yet by any service.
McMasters has therefore proposed that the MSRT, SMA and
Cost MOEs presented earlier be used for each essentiality
class
.
Information concerning the critical composition of
the IIP is provided by the next four simple MOEs. For
instance the ratio of critical line items, quantities
or costs to the corresponding total IIP values all provide
insight into how much of the IIP consists of critical
parts. Also a measure of the percentage of critical
parts which compose IIP shortages would be useful.
Since a comprehensive criticality scheme, such as
the one proposed in reference [25], is not available
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this paper resorts to the NMCS (Not Mission Capable,
Supply) and the combat essentiality code data elements
in current USMC automated files. FMF personnel assign
an NMCS indicator when, in their judgment, the want of
that part deadlines or severely degrades the operation
of a readiness reportable weapon system. CEC codes are
assigned by MCLBA personnel during the initial source
coding of secondary items; a CEC code of 4 or 5 designates
a secondary item as critical to the operation of its
weapon system. Normally, but not always, NMCS indic-
ators are assigned only to CEC 4 or 5 coded part
requi si t ions
.
F. RANGE AND DEPTH MEASURES
Initial issue provisioning can be categorized into
range and depth decisions. Range is the choice of whether
or not to include a part in the IIP. Depth is the choice
of how many units of a part to include. The supply
support MOEs discussed earlier give some indication of
IIP range and depth effectiveness. In this section a
slightly different perspective to IIP range and depth
is presented.
One minus the ratio of the number of line items
demanded to the total number of IIP line items would
show the percentage of no-range demand. Substituting
number of units demanded for line items and the total
number of units of each item in the above ratio would
show a percentage of no-depth demand.
These simple measures give a general idea of the
utility of the IIP. They could be further subdivided
into percentage NMCS of range and depth to examine the
utility of critical parts in the IIP.
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G. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed five general categories of
provisioning measures of effectiveness: weapon system
readiness, supply support, cost, essentiality, and range
and depth. While no MOE satisfies all five criteria,
Congress and DOD prefer measures that relate resources
(i.e., total investment) to readiness.
In keeping with the overriding objectives of SIWSM
and the USMC Provisioning Manual all MOEs should be
computed by individual weapon systems. Table I sum-
marizes the candidate measures.
32
TABLE 1
CANDIDATE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
READINESS
1. Weapon System Availability (Ao)
2. Non-availability, Provisioning ( Np
)
3. LM2 Percentage
4. Component Availability (Ao(Si))
SUPPLY SUPPORT
1. Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT)
2. Supply Material Availability ( SMA
)
3. Backorder Percentage (B0£)










1. Critical IIP, Range
2. Critical IIP, Depth
3. Critical IIP, Dollar Value





2. Percentage No-Depth Demand
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IV. PROVISIONING DATA ELEMENTS
This chapter explores the data elements necessary for
automated computation of the MOEs presented in the pre-
vious chapter. It begins by analyzing data elements
resident in USMC automated files. For deficiencies
identified, proposals for refinement of existing ele-
ments or creation of new data elements are presented.
Appendices B, C, D and E are a compendium of this chapter.
A. READINESS DATA
1 . Weapon System Availability
For weapon system availability it will be useful
to compute two numbers, operational availability (Ao) and
the percentage of nonavailability due to lack of parts
( Np ) . Np is the difference between Ao and inherent





Ai - MTBF (2
)
MTBF~T MTTR
Np - Ao - Ai (3)
MTBF and MTTR represent reliability and maintainability
measures determined by system engineering design decisions
and are thus beyond the control of the provisioner. MSRT
is chosen as a surrogate measure of mean logistic delay
time (MLDT) for two reasons. First, because it depicts
a measure related to the inventory of repair parts.
Next, it is easier to calculate the MSRT.
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a. Mean Time Between Failure
The Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance
Management System (MIMMS) defines MTBF as the average
equipment operation between equipment failures [26:A-
14]. Equipment operation is expressed by the equipment
operating time code ( EOTC ) which can be in units of
days, hours, rounds or miles depending on the type of
equipment involved.
MTBF = Sum o f EOT Between Failures (4)
"Numb er o f~Fsn ure Ac-ti ons
Even if EOTC values are in rounds or miles, the MTBF
must be in units of time to be compatible with MTTR and
MSRT. Two remedies are offered. First, an MTBF ex-
pressed in miles could be converted to time units by
use of a conversion factor, say, 42 miles per day for
example 4
. Thus an MTBF of 6000 miles would be equivalent
to an MTBF of 142.86 days which could then be commensurate
with MTTR and MSRT. This approach is sensitive to the
choice of a conversion factor, which should be derived
empirically for each case when the EOTC is not in time
uni ts
.
A different approach computes MTBF in days,
not in hours, miles or rounds and uses other data resident
in the MIMMS/AIS ERO History File:
MTBF - Sum of (DCD.1 - ERO CLO S DATE1 ) (5)
rn)e-a-dl IITe-d-ERO "3 ~ L
For each deadlined equipment repair order (ERO) 5 the
4
. This is an arbitrarily chosen factor based on
the rough estimate that a truck averages 15000 miles per
year. (15000 miles/365 days is about 42 miles per day).
5
. The ERO is the standard maintenance work order
document to record all required maintenance information
and authorize the requisitioning of parts. Data from
the ERO is entered into MIMMS/AIS. A category code of
M or P designates a weapon system as deadlined.
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deadline control date (DCD) is compared to the date the
previously deadlined ERO (for the same serial number) was
taken off deadline status. The ERO date is computed by-
adding the actual number of days deadlined (DDL) to the
original DCD.
The maintenance history of an M60 machine gun
provides an example. Its most recent DCD was Julian
date 6 7300. A look at the previous deadlined ERO for
this machine gun reveals a DCD of 7050 and the number
of DDL as 25. So to find the time between failure (TBF)
the equation would be 7300 - (7050 + 25) which results
in a TBF of 225 days. Sum the TBFs for all instances
of failure and all serial numbers. The average of these
values would be the MTBF.
To compute MTBF using either equation (4) or
(5) simply sum the times between failure, then divide
by the actual number of failures (deadlined EROs ) .
Formula (5) uses data available in MIMMS/AIS, but does
not account for actual usage (i.e., number of rounds
fired) of a weapon system. Thus, either method chosen
to compute MTBF will be an approximation. The first is
sensitive to the choice of a conversion factor, while
the second is sensitive to usage variation.
By definition, MTBF is concerned with failure
actions and accounts only for unscheduled corrective
maintenance. It will be used for both the Ao and the
Ai availability measures.
All data elements required for computation
of MTBF are in the ERO History File and include:
CAT CD DDL DCD
EOTC ERO CL0S DATE ERO NR
ID NR SER-NR ~
6
. The Julian date is a four-digit number which
expresses the year and the day of the year. For instance
January 23. 1987 would be a Julian date of 7023, showing
it as "the 23rd day of 1987.
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The computations include:
1. Sura of EOT between failures (EOTBF).
2. Multiply EOTBF by the conversion constant.
3. Count of Deadlined EROs (Cat Code - either M
or P with a DCD ) .
4. Divide the ,product from step 2 by the result
of step 3 (MTBF).
b. Mean Time to Repair
MIMMS defines the mean time to repair as
the average number of maintenance man-hours expended in
repairing an item which requires corrective maintenance
(CM) [26:A-14].
of CM Man-Hours (6)m II— —, «CM-Ac-tioTTs-
This formula computes a result in time units, but it
may be inaccurate due to the method of calculating CM
man-hours. The ERO history file can only store three
maintenance actions (by defect code (DEF_CD) and asso-
ciated military labor hours (MIL_LAB_HRS ) ) for each
ERO. Current procedures permit non-critical and pre-
ventive maintenance accomplishments to appear on the
same ERO. Also, more than three maintenance actions
can be recorded on the paper ERO. So, to accurately
compute MTTR , a coding scheme would have to link specific
defect codes with CM. No such scheme now exists. A
revised formula is therefore proposed to compute an
approximate MTTR:
MTTR - SUM of MIL-LAB-HRS (7)24-»_ ( #_De^dl iTTe'd-ERO'S"
)
This measure may include some preventive maintenance
labor hours. However, it is felt that they will be insig-
nificant so this approximation should meet our purpose.
The computations for formula (7) require
counting the number of deadlined EROS for a specific
Item Designator Number (ID_NR) to provide the denominator
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An ID_NR uniquely identifies a particular type of weapon
system. The numerator is the sum of the military labor
hours. The constant 24 converts the hour measure into
days. Inherent availability, Ai , can now be computed
using the MTBF and MTTR values in formula (2).
All data elements needed to compute MTTR
reside in the ERO History File:
CAT CD ERO NR ID NR
MIL~LAB_HRS ~ -
The computational steps are:
1. Sum MIL LAB HRS for all deadlined EROs.
2. Count the number of deadlined EROs.
3. Divide the result of step 1 by the result of
step 2.
4. Divide the result of step 3 by 24 to convert MTTR
to a day value.
c. Mean Supply Response Time
To compute the denominator of operational
availability, Ao , the mean logistic delay time (MLDT)
must be computed. As stated earlier, MLDT involves all
the delays that inhibit equipment operation due to lack
of resources. Only one resource, repair parts, is of
interest here. Hence MSRT is chosen as a surrogate for
MLDT. Neither MLDT nor MSRT is defined in MIMMS. A
review of MIMMS data elements suggests two possible
approaches to compute MSRT. The first divides the total
time that an ERO was awaiting parts by the number of
deadlined EROs.
MSRT - Sum of Days SHT PRTS (8)
—#-De-5dl iTTe-d-EROS
—
The deadlined ERO count is the same number used in the
MTBF and MTTR computations. To compute the number of
days short parts subtract the Julian date the ERO was
placed in a SHT_PRTS status from the Julian date of the
subsequent job status for that ERO.
For example, if an ERO was placed in a short
parts status on Julian date 7200 and the Julian date of
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the next job status was 7225, then the number of days
in a short parts status for this ERO would be 25 days.
Sum these values to arrive at the numerator.
Formula (8) gives a worst case value because
it includes both the administrative processing time as
well as the longest delay for any part. Suppose 10
parts were ordered and 9 arrived in 3 days but the other
part arrived in 30 days. Then the number days in a
SHT_PRTS status for that ERO would be at least 30 days
even though most parts arrived in less than 30 days.
A second method of computing MSRT determines
the average requisition response time. Two files, the
provisioning file and the ERO/DOC file, must be created.
The provisioning file provides a baseline list of IIP
parts information while the ERO/DOC file contains the
actual parts demand history over the IIP time period 7 .
Since IIP parts information is not now resi-
dent in MIMMS or SASSY files, the provisioning file
would have to be constructed from a weapon system's
Initial Issue Control File which is described in reference
[3]. The provisioning file will contain only the CEC
code, ID number, national stock number ( NSN ) , quantity
and unit price (U/P).
Parts demand history from the MIMMS/ AIS
Document Status file is needed next. A sub-file, the
ERO/DOC File, must be created which will first separate
all deadlined EROs by ID_NR of interest. The ERO numbers
of this file are then matched to the ERO numbers of the
Document Status File. This results in a list of all
document numbers for EROs for a particular weapon system.
To ensure that only IIP parts are used in computations,
include only the document numbers of those actual demand
7 Appendix C describes all created sub-files dis
cussed in this chapter.
39
national stock numbers ( NSNa ) which match a provisioning
list national stock number (NSNp).
MSRT = Sum of (RCVD„DATE - DO C DATE) (9)
To"t31-#~D6cuments~—
For each document number, subtract the date the parts
were ordered (DOC_DATE) from the date the parts were
received (RCVD_DATE) by the using unit. Sum these differ-
ences to get a numerator called the total supply response
time (TSRT). Count the documents to arrive at the
denominator. Thus MSRT is the average time delay awaiting
parts for deadlined weapon systems.
Two files are needed for these computations:
ERO/DOC file
Provisioning file
The data elements needed to generate MSRT are:
DOC DATE DOC NR ERO NR
ID_NR NSN~ RCVD_DATE
The computational steps are:
1. Include only document numbers for which NSNa - NSNp.
2. Subtract DOC DATE from RCVD DATE.
3. Sum the differences in step~2 to get TSRT.
4. Count the number of documents.
5. Divide TSRT by the number of documents.
MSRT is the final value needed to compute
operational availability, Ao , using formula (1). Ao
will be MOE 1.1. Another MOE , formula (3), represents
the percentage of weapon system non-availability due to
the wait for repair parts ( Np ) . Np will be MOE 1.2.
2 . LM2 Readiness
The USMC uses the Marine Automated Readiness Eval-
uation System to assess equipment readiness. MARES is
a weekly snapshot of the deadline rate and includes
only Marine Corps Bulletin 3000 designated items [27].
It is therefore a subset of the ERO History file. Since
only some, not all, new weapon systems are tracked, the
LM2 measure is insufficient for our purposes. Note,
however, that the LM2 algorithm to compute readiness
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could be modified to include category code P EROs; in
that case it would then approximate the Ao measure dis-
cussed earlier as it would include all new weapon systems
It would not be possible to produce a measure
similar to Np because LM2 data cannot compute specific





The parts availability measure Ao(Si) is of
limited utility because current databases are not de-
signed to capture pertinent data. Actual part failure
data is needed to compute this measure. Under current
procedures some parts are replaced before they fail,
other parts may fail but not degrade weapon system avail-
ability and so are not replaced immediately. Further,
an MSRT for each reparable can not be measured because
demand for reparables is not traceable to a specific
weapon system (for example, an alternator may be common
to a whole fleet of motor vehicles). Due to the extreme
difficulty in developing data for this measure it will
not be further considered.
4 Summary
Weapon system readiness measures, Ao and Np , can
be implemented with existing data and minor procedural
changes in MIMMS/AIS files. The LM2/MARES measure could
also be used but needs a minor modification to include
all new weapon systems. Finally, the parts availability
model would require new data elements and the associated
collection procedures.
B. SUPPLY SUPPORT DATA
1 . Mean Supply Response Time
The MSRT discussed earlier is a good starting
point for a gross supply support measure. It can be
further subdivided into more specific measures.
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First, it can be segregated into an MSRT for
consumables and an MSRT for reparables. To do this
sort the ERO/DOC file by advice code (ADV_CD). Put all
documents with an advice code of 2_ into a separate
sub-file (ERO/DOC/CON file) for consumables, and put
all documents with an advice code of F_ into the ERO/-
DOC/REP sub-file for reparables. Then compute an MSRT
for each sub-file. The computational steps for MSRT
will be the same as in formula (9), but two other sub-
files must be substituted for the ERO/DOC file:
ERO/DOC/CON file
ERO/DOC/REP file
In addition to the data elements for MSRT cited above,
one more is needed:
ADV_CD
The numbering for MOEs will be:
MOE 2.1a Total MSRT (MSRTt)
MOE 2.1b Consumable MSRT fMSRTc
)
MOE 2.1c Reparable MSRT (MSRTr)
2 . Supply Material Availability
The supply material availability measure compares
the provisioning file to one of the ERO/DOC files.
First, a total SMA would be desirable, then a breakdown
by consumables and reparables would be appropriate.
Each category could be further subdivided into range
and depth measures.
First, compare the provisioning list to the
ERO/DOC file to find every national stock number match
between the provisioning list ( NSNp ) and the actual
demand ( NSNa ) for the IIP time period. This number
will be the numerator. The denominator is the count of
NSNa
.
SMA ,r = Tot al Range Match (10)
—CoTnTt-o-f-NSNS
—
The same steps could be performed using the ERO/DOC/CON
and ERO/DOC/REP sub-file Instead of the ERO/DOC file.
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The "_" after the SMA in the above formula denotes that
a total, consumable or reparable SMA can be computed.
Thus the range SMA could be sub-divided out into a con-
sumable and a reparable measure ( SMAc , r and SMAr.r).
A depth SMA necessitates a more elaborate proce-
dure. The formula is shown below.
SMA ,d - # Depth Supplied by IIP (11)
Tc^tSl-QTraTrt i t3T~DeT!raTrde-d
First, sort the ERO/DOC file by NSN. If an NSN appears
more than once the quantities must then be summed to
create a new ERO/DOC/SUM file. This file will then be
compared to the provisioning file. Regardless of whether
there is an NSN match or not, subtract the provisioning
list quantity ( Qp ) from the actual quantity demanded (Qa)
for each NSN of actual demand. Call this number Qap.
Sum all Qap where Qap > and call this total depth
shortages. Sum all Qa and call this the total quantity
demanded. Subtract the total depth shortages from the
total quantity demanded to find the # depth supplied
IIP, the numerator. To find SMA, divide the # depth
supplied IIP by the total quantity demanded. Substitution
of consumable or reparable sub-files results in an SMA
consumable or reparable depth measure.
The numbering for SMA MOEs is:
MOE 2.2a Total SMA Range (SMAt.r)
MOE 2.2b Total SMA Depth (SMAt.d,
MOE 2.2c Consumable SMA Range (SMAc,r)
MOE 2. 2d Consumable SMA Depth ,[SMAc,d)
MOE 2.2e Reparable SMA Range ( SMAr , r
)
MOE 2.2f Reparable SMA Depth SMAr,d)
The additional data element needed is: QTY









Each MOE will produce a value between and 1 with an





The backorder percentage, which can be computed
by subtracting any of the depth SMA percentages from
1, will be called MOE 2.3.
4 ADDDR
Average Days Delay for Delayed Requisitions is
computed by dividing the MSRT by one minus the total
range SMA. ADDDR will be MOE 2.4.
5 Summary
This section resulted in four generic supply
support MOEs. The MSRT and the SMA were sub-divided
into total, consumable and reparable measures. The
backorder percentage and the ADDDR used results from
MSRT and SMA calculations.
C. COST DATA
1 . Investment Cost
The total Investment cost is the total IIP dollar
value. Using the data from the provisioning file, multi-
ply each Qp by the unit price and call this PQp. Sum
all PQp to arrive at the investment cost. Even though
money spent for parts may not equate to effectiveness
achieved, for purposes of consistency the investment
cost will be called MOE 3.1.
2 . Order Cost
Determination of an order cost begins with a
comparison of actual parts demanded to the IIP depth.
First execute the same procedures discussed in the depth
computation of the SMA MOE; that is, subtract the pro-
visioned quantity from the actual quantity demanded to
get a Qap value. This value would be greater than
when the IIP quantity was less than the actual quantity
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demanded (shortage) and less than when the IIP quan-
tity was in excess of actual demand (overage). For
shortages, parts would have to be backordered and a
special backorder cost per order would be used to compute
an order processing cost. This standard cost would
have to be incorporated into the software program that
computes provisioning effectiveness. Multiply the cost
per order by the number of parts (sum of all Qp for Op
> ) to arrive at an order cost for the weapon system.
This will be MOE 3.2.
3 . Overage Cost
To compute the overage cost, include only NSNs
for which Qap < 0. These represent the excess parts at
the end of the IIP time period. For each part, add the
investment cost ( PQp ) to the absolute value of the excess
parts dollar value ( PQap ) ; divide this sum by 2 to arrive
at an average dollar value of inventory (PQi) for the
IIP time period. Sum all PQi to arrive at the average
dollar value of the entire IIP for the IIP time period.
Multiply the sum of all PQi by the inventory
holding rate (K2) and by the IIP time period to arrive
at the overage cost. The inventory holding rate, like
the backorder cost per order, would be contained in the
software program that computes provisioning effective-
ness. The overage cost is MOE 3.3.
It should be obvious that both the order and
overage MOE could be further separated into MOEs for
consumables or for reparables although these were not
mentioned in Chapter III.
4 . Overage Percentage
To evaluate the impact of slow movers compare
the investment cost of excess parts to the IIP invest-
ment cost. To accomplish MOE 3.4 divide the dollar
value of the parts remaining in the IIP (the absolute
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The four MOEs discussed in this section are:
MOE 3.1 Investment Cost
MOE 3.2 Order Cost
MOE 3.3 Overage Cost
MOE 3.4 Overage Percentage
Cost computations require these additional data elements:
U/P
Cost per Order (Kl)
Inventory Holding Rate (K2)
The files needed for the computations are:
ERO/DOC file
Provisioning file
Two reminders are warranted. Both the order cost the
overage cost are sensitive to the constants chosen;
they should therefore be derived from empirical data.
Finally, the cost measures cited show only the dollar
cost associated with expedited backordering and holding
of inventory, not the costs of inoperable weapon systems.
D. ESSENTIALITY DATA
The goal of a essentiality measure is to focus atten-
tion on those parts that render a weapon system inoper-
able. It is therefore a subset of parts files discussed
thus far. A key to computation is to accurately devise
a way to sort the provisioning file or one of the ERO/DOC
files into sub-files that contain only critical parts.
From the provisioning file the combat essentiality code
( CEC ) could be used. This presumes, of course, that
the codes have been assigned accurately (which may not
be the case, as was observed in references [4], [13] and
[25]).
The CEC is not included in a parts document number.
So the ERO/DOC files must be sorted to include only
documents with a NMCS indicator of N or 9. An NMCS
indicator is assigned by FMF maintenance personnel to
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highlight those parts that deadline a weapon system.
This designation need not be limited to CEC critical
parts, so there is a possibility of data inconsistency.
Using CECs and NMCS indicators, sub-files can be
created to compute any of the aforementioned MSRT , SMA
or cost MOEs for critical parts. The computations would
be identical, but the files would include only parts
designated as critical.
Four other measures may be useful to evaluate the
IIP in terms of criticality. The first is the ratio of
critical IIP range to the total IIP range. Next would
be the ratio of critical IIP depth to total IIP depth.
A third would be a ratio of the dollar value of IIP
critical parts to the total dollar value of the IIP.
Only the PROV/CRIT sub-file is needed for these MOEs.
A fourth measure suggested is the ratio of the quan-
tity of critical IIP shortages to the total quantity of
IIP shortages. This compares the provisioning and ERO/DOC
critical sub-files using the steps cited in formula (10)
earl ier
.
In summary, four essentiality MOEs were presented:
MOE 4.1 Percentage IIP Critical, Range
MOE 4.2 Percentage IIP Critical, Depth
MOE 4.3 Percentage IIP Critical, Dollar Value
MOE 4.4 Percentage IIP Critical, Shortages
Two additional data elements required for these compu-
tations are:
CEC NMCS
The files needed to compute these MOEs:
ERO/DOC/CRIT file
PROV/CRIT file
E. RANGE AND DEPTH DATA
The MSRT and SMA measures reflect range and depth
impacts, however it could prove useful to view range
and depth in other ways.
One might be to show the IIP range that was not
demanded. To do this count all NSNs on the provisioning
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list which do not match any ERO/DOC file NSN. This is
the numerator and will be called no-demand, range. The
denominator would be a count of NSNp . This MOE shows
the percentage of no-demand, range.
To find the same type of measure regarding depth,
sum the quantities of all items where the Oap > to
get the numerator. Divide this amount by the sum of
all Qp to arrive at the percentage of no-demand, depth.
The two range and depth MOEs are:
MOE 5.1 Percentage No-Demand, Range
MOE 5.2 Percentage No-Demand, Depth
No additional data elements are needed to compute these




Candidate measures of effectiveness were analyzed
for practical implementation by examining the availability
and appropriateness of data elements resident in USMC
maintenance and supply files. Table 2 summarizes the




PROPOSED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
READINESS
1.1 Weapon System Availability ( Ao
)
1.2 Non-availability, Provisioning ( Np )
SUPPLY SUPPORT
2.1a Total Mean Supply Response Time (MSRTt)
2.1b Consumable MSRT (MSRTc)
2.1c Reparable MSRT (MSRTr)
2.2a Total SMA , Range (SMAt.r)
2.2b Total SMA, Depth (SMAt.d)
2.2c Consumable SMA, Range ( SMAc
2. 2d Consumable SMA, Depth [SMAc
2.2e Reparable SMA, Range (SMAr,
2.2f Reparable SMA, Depth (SMAr,
2.3 Backorder Percentage (B0%)








4.1 Percentage IIP Critical, Range
4.2 Percentage IIP Critical, Depth
4.3 Percentage IIP Critical, Dollar Value
4.4 Percentage IIP Critical, Shortages
RANGE AND DEPTH
5.1 Percentage No-Demand, Range
5.2 Percentage No-Demand, Depth
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Several alternative criteria and MOEs regarding the
USMC provisioning effort were investigated. Twenty-three
specific measures of effectiveness resulted from this
thesis
.
A review of DOD and USMC directives establish the
goals of provisioning, policy guidance and general back-
ground information. The responsibilities of HQMC , MCLBA
and the FMF were outlined and the pertinent aspects of
the MCLBA WS/AIS development effort were described.
Five general categories of MOEs were presented.
Several possible candidate concepts were reviewed and
the relative merits of each were analyzed. Particularly
problematic and confounding areas received special em-
phasis. An initial list of desirable MOEs was produced.
The practical implementation of MOEs was considered
by defining the data elements and the sub-files needed
for computation. Using USMC automated maintenance and
supply files as a starting point, data elements were
identified, modified and manipulated. The resulting
list furnishes a basis for immediate MOE implementation
at a reasonable cost.
Appendices B, C, D and E condense the significant
results of the thesis. All data elements are defined,
proposed sub-files are described, and an MOE/data element
matrix is presented.
B. CONCLUSIONS
CMC has directed the MCLBA to implement a provisioning
effectiveness evaluation system. Given this edict,
MCLBA must opt for the best implementation approach as
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well as determine specific measures. To contribute to
this effort, the following conclusions are offered:
1. Five generic categories emerge as desirable provi-
sioning objectives: weapon system readiness, supply
support, cost, essentiality and range and depth.
2. No category or specific MOE is fault free. All
have merits and drawbacks. Therefore, consideration
must be given to whose information needs can best
be met by implementing any of the stated MOEs.
3. The weapon system readiness measures, Ao and Np
,
are the only MOEs that relate provisioning to
availability. Despite its perceived desirability
as a resources to readiness metric, the connection
is weak at best. A further disadvantage accrues
in that data elements now resident in USMC computer
files must be modified to accommodate these MOEs.
4. The two supply support measures, MSRT and SMA
,
pertain more directly to provisioning effectiveness.
MSRT demonstrates supply responsiveness while
proposed SMAs give various batting averages of
IIP performance. These measures can be computed
from current data elements and files, but no direct
relationship to readiness can be ascribed to SMA.
5. Cost MOEs put a dollar value on IIP shortfalls
and excesses. The investment cost shows the IIP
dollar value. The order cost puts a value on
expedited backorders and should include the cost
of inoperable weapon systems. However, this latter
cost is impossible to determine. Inventory holding
costs are an integral part of the overage cost
MOE. Finally, the overage percentage depicts the
ratio the of dollar value of excess to total the
investment cost.
6. MOEs involving essentiality are almost as important
as the readiness measures. MSRT and SMA measures
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could be of even greater usefulness If they In-
cluded only the critical repair parts that render
a weapon system Inoperable. The main drawback of
current essentiality measures is suspect data
integrity because of the methodology of CEC and
NMCS indicator assignment.
7. Range and depth MOEs show IIP ineffectiveness.
They may provide useful data to meet headquarters
reporting requirements, but are of questionable
value as feedback to provisioners
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis examined but one part of a large, complex
provisioning endeavor. Three further areas for research
and action have emerged from this study.
1. The DOD SIWSM guide, a fertile repository for
logistic research and development, directs far-
reaching conceptual changes to USMC management
and reporting systems. Two particularly problem-
atic issues encountered, and encompassed in SIWSM,
deserve further research. First, weapon system
availability measures should be refined to isolate
the contribution of resource support (i.e., repair
parts) to readiness. Secondly, quantifying the
cost of an inoperable weapon system would serve
not only to improve the shortage cost MOE , but
also would provide better estimates of the risk
of shortages (i.e. the lambda parameter of the
COSDIF model [7: Encl. 3]) for provisioning fore-
casting models.
2. The complexity of data relationships needed for
the MOE computation requires considerable file
processing time. Therefore, as it relates to this
subject matter, a relational database with simple
query procedures better suits the task. As such,
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it is presented as an important alternative to
consider for WS/AIS system development.
3. A next logical step, and possible thesis topic,
is to design a relational database and the cor-
responding software which provide output reports
to implement the aforementioned MOEs.
Implementation of MOEs is another step toward improve-
ment of USMC provisioning policy. Since these MOEs are
after-the-fact, it will be too late to affect the initial
repair part provisioning for the evaluated weapon system.
Thus, the lessons learned from MOEs will have to be
applied to new weapon systems. Ultimately, the best
MOE should be utilized as the objective function for
Marine Corps provisioning forecasting models. Operations
research optimization techniques, similar to those in
reference [22], can then be used to determine both the




ADDDR Average Days Delay for Delayed Requisitions
Al Inherent Availability
AIS Automated Information System
Ao Operational Availability
BO Backorder
CEC Combat Essentiality Code
CM Corrective Maintenance
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
DCD Deadline Control Date
DDL Days Deadlined
DOD Department of Defense
EOTC Equipment Operating Time Code
ERO Equipment Repair Order
FMF Fleet Marine Force
GOL Garrison Operating Level
HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps
ID Item Designator
IIP Initial Issue Provisioning
LSA Logistic Support Analysis
MARES Marine Automated Readiness Evaluation System
MCLBA Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia
MIMMS Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management
System
M3S Marine Corps Standard Supply System
MLDT Mean Logistic Delay Time
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
MSRT Mean Supply Response Time
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
MTTR Mean Time to Repair
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MUMMS Marine Corps Unified Materiel Management System
NMCS Not Mission Capable, Supply
Np Non-availability due to provisioning
NSN National Stock Number
NSO Numeric Stockage Objective
OST Order and Ship Time
PCLT Prjcurement Leadtime
PTD Provisioning Technical Documentation
PWR Pre-posi tioned War Reserve
SIWSM Secondary Item Weapon System Management
SMA Supply Materiel Availability





The following is an alphabetical list of the data
elements needed to compute the proposed MOEs. An asterisk
indicates a data element not now resident in USMC files.
Refer to the numbering in Appendix C to cross-index the
data elements with the files where used.




FILES WHERE USED: 4,5,7,8
DESCRIPTION: A two-digit code assigned by the
originator to request supply action be taken by
the processing point.




FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: A one character code which iden-








FILE WHERE USED: 11
DESCRIPTION: A one-digit code which designates
the criticality of the part to its weapon system.




FILES WHERE USED: Not part of a file per se,
but used for shortage cost computations. Must
be included in software to compute order cost MOE
.
DESCRIPTION: A dollar value which denotes an







FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: The total number of days that a weapon





FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: The date the weapon system was
reported inoperable.
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FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: A three character code to identify
specific problems for equipment inducted for repair
The first position identifies the major sub-system
involved, the other two positions relate to the
specific defect.




FILES WHERE USED: 2 through 9
DESCRIPTION: The date the requisition was entered
into the supply system. Contained within the







FILES WHERE USED: 2 through 9
DESCRIPTION: A unique code to identify a req-
uisition during the entire supply processing
cycle. Consists of the requisi tioner ' s accounting









FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: A one character code to indicate
whether units of operation is measured in days,
hours, miles, or rounds.




FILES WHERE USED: 1 through 9
DESCRIPTION: A unique five character code assign
ed to a work request to identify the cost of main
tenance performed.




FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: The date the ERO was terminated.
13
.




FILES WHERE USED: Not part of a file per se
,
but used for overage cost computations. Must
be included in software to compute either of
the overage cost MOEs
.
DESCRIPTION: A value between and 1 to denote








FILES WHERE USED: 1 through 11
DESCRIPTION: A number which uniquely identifies
any weapon system (i.e., all M60 tanks).




FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: A code which to describes the
status of equipment undergoing repair.




FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: The accumulated hours incurred
for the repair of a weapon system. Includes




ACRONYM: NSN , NSNa , NSNp
FORMAT: alpha-numeric
LENGTH: 13
FILES WHERE USED: 2 through 11
DESCRIPTION: The stock number to uniquely iden-
tify all parts in the DOD supply system, This
thesis used the abbreviations NSNa for actual
demand and NSNp for provisioned repair parts.
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FILES WHERE USED: 2, 3 and 9
DESCRIPTION: A material condition indicating a






ACRONYM: QTY , Qa, Qp
FORMAT: numeric
LENGTH: 2
FILES WHERE USED: 2, 3 and 6 through 11
DESCRIPTION: The number of parts for each NSN.
This thesis used the abbreviations Qa for parts
requested and Qp for parts in IIP.




FILES WHERE USED: 2 through 9
DESCRIPTION: The date the ordered repair part
was received by the requesting unit.




FILE WHERE USED: 1
DESCRIPTION: A number to uniquely identify a







FILES WHERE USED: 10,11
DESCRIPTION: The price of one unit of issue of a




This appendix relates the data elements to recommended
files and sub-files. Two of the files, the ERO History
File and the Document Status File, exist now. Various
combinations and subsets of these files compose the
sub-files needed for many of the computations. The
provisioning file, while not in the current USMC database
structure could be added. The data needed is formulated
following the procedures in Chapter VI of reference
[3]. Note that in a relational database configuration,
the sub-file structures could be generated dynamically




DATA ELEMENTS: CAT_CD , DDL, DCD , DEF_CD , EOTC
,
ERO_NR, ERO_CLOS, ID_NR, JOB_STAT,
MIL_LAB_HRS, SER_NR
APPLICABLE MOEs: 1.1, 1.2
DESCRIPTION: The primary maintenance information file
of MIMMS/AIS.
2. DOCUMENT STATUS FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_DATE , DOC_NR, NSNa , NMCS , Qa,
RCVD_DATE
APPLICABLE MOEs: 1.1, 1.2




DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , DOC_DATE, DOC_NR, ERO_NR
,
ID_NR, NSNa, RCVD_DATE
APPLICABLE MOEs: 1.1, 1.2, 2.1a, 2.2a, 2.3, 2.4,
3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.1, 5.2
DESCRIPTION: A file which marries the range of
demanded repair parts documents to specific weapon
systems using ERO_NR as a key.
ERO/DOC/CON FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , DOC_DATE , DOC_NR , ERO_NR
ID_NR, NSNa, RCVD_DATE
APPLIICABLE MOEs: 2.1b, 2.2c
DESCRIPTION: A file which marries range of demanded
consumable to specific weapon systems using ERO_NR
as a key. Includes only documents with an advice
code of 2_ .
ERO/DOC/REP FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , DOC_DATE, DOC_NR , ERO_NR ,
ID_NR, NSNa, RCVD_DATE
APPLICABLE MOEs: 2.1c, 2.2e
DESCRIPTION: A file which marries the range of
demanded reparables to specific weapon systems using
ERO_NR as a key. Includes only documents with an
advice code of F__.
ERO/DOC/SUM FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_DATE, DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR,
NSNa, Qa, RCVD_DATE
APPLICABLE MOE: 2.2b
DESCRIPTION: A file which marries the depth of
demanded repair parts to specific weapon systems
using ERO_NR as a key.
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7. ERO/DOC/CON/SUM FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , DOC_DATE, DOC_NR, ERO_NR
,
ID_NR, NSNa, Qa, RCVD_DATE
APPLICABLE MOE: 2 . 2d
DESCRIPTION: A file which marries the depth of
demanded consumables to specific weapon systems
using ERO_NR as a key. Includes only document numb-
ers with an advice code of 2_.
8. ERO/ DOC /REP /SUM FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , DOC_DATE , DOC_NR , ERO_NR
ID_NR, NSNa, Qa, RCVD_DATE
APPLICABLE MOEs: 2.2f
DESCRIPTION: A file which marries the depth of
demanded reparables to specific weapon systems using
the ERO_NR as a key. Includes only documents with
an advice code of F_.
9. ERO/DOC/CRIT FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_DATE, DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR,
NMCS, NSNa, 3a, RCVD_DATE
APPLICABLE MOEs: 2.1a, 2.4, 4.4
DESCRIPTION: A file which marries demand for critical
parts to specific weapon systems using the ERO_NR
as a key. Includes only documents with a NMCS in-




DATA ELEMENTS: ID_NR, NSNp , Qp , U/P
APPLICABLE MOEs: 1.1, 1.2, 2.1a, 2.1b, 2.1c, 2.2a,
2.2b, 2.2c, 2. 2d, 2 . 2e , 2.2f, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2,
3.3, 5.1, 5.2,
DESCRIPTION: A file initially derived from the
Initial Issue Control File which consists of repair
parts in the IIP.
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11 . PROV/CRIT FILE
DATA ELEMENTS: CEC , ID_NR, NSNp
, Qp , U/P
APPLICABLE MOEs: 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4
DESCRIPTION: A file which contains only critical





In this appendix, the 23 proposed MOEs are defined
and their data elements are identified. Also listed
are the files necessary should a file processing procedure
be required.
1 . WEAPON SYSTEM AVAILABILITY ( Ao )
MOE NUMBER: 1.1
DATA ELEMENTS: CAT_CD , DDL, DCD , DEF_CD , DOC_DATE
,
DOC_NR, EOTC, ERO_NR , ERO_CLOS
,
ID_NR, JOB_STAT, MIL_LAB_HRS NSNa
,
NSNp, RCVD_DATE, SER_NR




DESCRIPTION: A percentage measure of weapon system
readiness. Will range from to 100$ with 100£
indicating that all weapon systems were operable for
the given time period.
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NON-AVAILABILITY PROVISIONING ( Np
)
MOE NUMBER: 1.2
DATA ELEMENTS: CAT_CD , DDL, DCD, DEF_CD , DOC_DATE
,
DOC_NR, EOTC, ERO_NR , ERO_CLOS,
ID_NR, JOB_STAT, MIL_LAB_HRS, NSNa
NSNp
, SER_NR




DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the contribution of
repair part shortages to a weapon system's deadline
rate. Will range from to 100^ with 0£ meaning no
weapon system was deadlined for want of parts.
TOTAL MSRT (MSRTt
)
MOE NUMBER: 2. la
DATA ELEMENTS: D0C_DATE, D0C_NR , ER0_NR , ID_NR,
NSNa, NSNp, RCVD_DATE
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: The average number of days delay for
all repair parts for a weapon system.
CONSUMABLE MSRT (MSRTc)
MOE NUMBER: 2.1b
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , D0C_DATE, D0C_NR , ER0_NR
,
ID_NR, NSNa, NSNp, RCVD_DATE
FILES REQUIRED: ER0/D0C/C0N File
Provisioning File





MOE NUMBER: 2. lc
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , DOC_DATE, DOC_NR , ERO_NR
,
ID_NR, NSNa, NSNp , RCVD_DATE
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC/REP File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: The average number of days delay for
reparables
.
TOTAL SMA RANGE (SMAt.r)
MOE NUMBER: 2.2a
DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa, NSNp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the IIP range match
to actual demand. A value of 100^ shows that all
range demands were met by the IIP.
TOTAL SMA DEPTH (SMAt,d)
MOE NUMBER: 2.2b
DATA ELEMENTS: D0C_NR , ER0_NR , ID_NR, NSNa, NSNp,
Qa, Qp,
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC/SUM File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the IIP depth match to
actual demand. A value of 100$ shows all demands
were met by the IIP.
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8. CONSUMABLE SMA RANGE ( SMAc , r
)
MOE NUMBER: 2.2c
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD, DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa
,
NSNp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC/CON File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the IIP range match to
actual demand for consumable items.
9. CONSUMABLE SMA DEPTH (SMAc.d)
MOE NUMBER: 2 . 2d
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa,
NSNp, Qa, Qp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/ DOC/ CON/SUM File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the IIP depth match
to actual demand for consumables.
10. REPARABLE SMA RANGE ( SMAr , r
)
MOE NUMBER: 2 . 2e
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , D0C_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa,
NSNp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC/REP File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the IIP range match
to actual demand for reparables.
11
.
REPARABLE SMA DEPTH (SMAr,d)
MOE NUMBER: 2.2f
DATA ELEMENTS: ADV_CD , D0C_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa,
NSNp, Qa, Qp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/ DOC/REP/SUM File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the IIP depth match




DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa , NSNp,
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the actual demand depth
that was not met by the IIP. Simply one minus SMAt.d.
13. AVERAGE ^AYS DELAY FOR DELAYED REQUISITIONS (ADDDR)
MOE NUMBER: 2.4
DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_DATE , DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR,
NSNa, NSNp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: The average days delay for critical
parts that were backordered. Simply the MSRTt divided





DATA ELEMENTS: ID_NR, Qp , U/P
FILES REQUIRED: Provisioning File






DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, Kl , NSNa,
NSNp, Qa, Qp, U/P
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A dollar estimate of expedited pro-






DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, K2 , NSNa
,
NSNp, Qa.Qp, U/P
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A dollar estimate of the inventory
holding costs, obsolescence costs and the time value
of money of IIP repair parts that were not demanded.
17. OVERAGE PERCENTAGE
MOE NUMBER: 3.4
DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_NR, ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa, NSNp,
Qa, Qp, U/P
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the dollar value of
excesses to the IIP investment cost.
18. PERCENTAGE IIP CRITICAL, RANGE
MOE NUMBER: 4.
1
DATA ELEMENTS: CEC , ID_NR, NSNp
FILE REQUIRED: PROV/CRIT File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of critical parts range
to total IIP range.
19. PERCENTAGE IIP CRITICAL, DEPTH
MOE NUMBER: 4 .2
DATA ELEMENTS: CEC, ID_NR, NSNp, Qp
FILE REQUIRED: PROV/CRIT File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the critical parts
depth to total IIP depth.
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20. PERCENTAGE IIP CRITICAL, DOLLAR VALUE
MOE NUMBER: 4.3
DATA ELEMENTS: CEC , ID_NR, NSNp , Qp , U/P
FILE REQUIRED: PROV/CRIT File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of the critical part
dollar value to the total IIP dollar value.
21
.
PERCENTAGE IIP CRITICAL, SHORTAGES
MOE NUMBER: 4.4
DATA ELEMENTS: CEC, DOC__NR
, ERO_NR , ID_NR, NMCS
,
NSNa, NSNp, Qa, Qp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC/CRIT File
PROV/CRIT File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of critical part shortages
to total number of IIP shortages.
22. PERCENTAGE NO-DEMAND, RANGE
MOE NUMBER: 5.
1
DATA ELEMENTS: D0C_NR , ERO_NR , ID_NR, NSNa, NSNp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File
DESCRIPTION: A percentage of no-demand, range for
IIP parts.
23. PERCENTAGE NO-DEMAND, DEPTH
MOE NUMBER: 5.2
DATA ELEMENTS: DOC_NR , ER0_NR , ID_NR, NSNa, NSNp,
Qa, Qp
FILES REQUIRED: ERO/DOC File
Provisioning File






Refer to Appendix B for data element abbreviations
and Appendix D for MOE numbering.
MOE NUMBERS
DATA ELEMENT 1. 1 1.2 2. la 2. lb 2. le 2.2a 2.2b 2.2c






DOC_DATE * * * * *
DOC_NR * * * * * * * *
EOTC * *
ERO_NR * * * * * * * *
ERO_CLOS * *





NSNa * * * * * * * *









DATA ELEMENT 2. 2d 2.2e 2.2f 2.3 2.4 3. 1 3.2 3. 3







DOC_NR * * * * * * *
EOTC
ERG_NR * * * * * * *
EROJTLOS





NSNa * * * * * * *
NSNp * * * * * * *
NMCS
Qa * * * *
Op * * * * *
RCVD.JDATE
3EP_NR
0/P * * *
MOE NUMBERS
DATA ELEMENT 3. 4 4. 1 4.2 4.3 4. 4 5. 1 5.2
ADV..CD
CAT_CD





DOC_NR * * * *
EOTC
ERO_NR * * * *
ERO_CLOS





NSNa * * * *
NSNp * * * * * * *
NMCS *
Qa * * *
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